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Abstract 
The creation of the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has turned the right to emit CO2 into a 
positively priced intermediate good for the affected firms. Firms thus face the decision whether to 
source compliance with the EU ETS within their boundaries or to acquire it through the permit trade. 
However, a combination of internal abatement, free permit allocation and flexibility to shift the use of 
their allocation across time creates opportunities to achieve compliance with the EU ETS without 
entering the permit trade. This paper aims to identify firm-level determinants of participation in and 
the extent of the permit trade while recognizing the possibility of zero trade flows leading to selection 
bias if unaccounted-for. We construct a firm-level dataset incorporating transaction-level information 
from both EU ETS operator and person holding accounts, thus representing the entire system-wide 
permit trade by CO2 emitters. We cover the supply and demand sides of the permit trade, both inter-
firm and intra-firm, and account for a wide set of firm-level characteristics using firms’ balance sheet 
information. A detailed descriptive analysis documents salient features of the firm-level permit trade. 
We then jointly model firms’ participation and amount decisions while allowing for possible self-
selection into trading. Our results suggest that participation in the permit trade is driven by a 
combination of firm-specific factors existing independently of the EU ETS, such as size, sector and 
ownership structure, and market-specific characteristics resulting from the firms’ inclusion in the EU 
ETS, such as the value of the firms’ free permit endowment and their relative allowance position. We 
find that amounts traded are mostly driven by market-specific factors. In contrast to the literature on 
the firm-level determinants of the general goods trade we do not find self-selection into trading. 
Keywords 
EU ETS, carbon emission permits, firm-level trade, inter-firm trade, intra-firm trade 
1 Introduction
The EU’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the first market for carbon emission rights
ever brought into operation on a continental scale, affecting all EU countries and a number of
industrial sectors.∗ It covers about one half of EU-wide CO2 emissions. The genesis of the EU
ETS has given rise to the creation of European Union Allowances (EUAs), each EUA providing
its holder with the right to emit one ton of CO2. EU ETS regulations ensure EUA equivalence
for compliance purposes, no matter where each particular EUA was issued, making them fully
tradable across the entire system. For the firms required by law to be a part of the EU ETS
the right to emit CO2 has been turned into a positively priced input factor to their production
function, as they now need to surrender permits equivalent to the amount of CO2 they emit
during each year.
In the case of a strict system forcing firms to cover their permit needs on the market imme-
diately the link from production decisions to the market for tradable permits would be direct.
However, certain features of the EU ETS lead to a weakening of this link. First, during EU
ETS Phase I, the period for which the appropriate data are currently available, firms received
free endowments of EUAs, which in many cases sufficed to fully cover their permit needs (cf.
Ellerman et al. (2010) for a thorough analysis of key features of EU ETS Phase I). Second, in
the EU ETS firms are not forced into a static optimization decision between abating and going
to the market on the demand side for permits, as well as between increasing emissions, selling
surplus permits or leaving them unused on the supply side. Instead, a dynamic component is
built into the system. Firms can borrow from their own free permit allocation for the following
year and bank unused allowances for future use.
Given the input character of emission permits, the CO2 emitting firm must decide whether
to source this particular intermediate good within its own boundaries or trade for it through
the market in any given year.1 In the case of underallocation with free allowances a firm decides
whether to source compliance with EU ETS regulations internally through a combination of
abatement and the use of its free allocation or whether to acquire compliance by trading via the
EU ETS. If a firm has an overallocation of free allowances it decides whether to keep surplus
compliance inside its boundaries or sell it to the market. In both cases firms may find it profitable
to generate additional internal abatement and sell this surplus on the market. Thus, in principle
the combination of internal abatement and free allocation makes it conceivable for firms to
remain in compliance with the EU ETS without ever having to participate in the allowance
trade. The intertemporal flexibility introduced through borrowing and banking further expands
firms’ opportunities for non-trading compliance. However, a priori we would not expect to
observe a pure non-trading outcome: Firms with a free allocation insufficient to cover its level of
emissions may find it inappropriately costly to solely abate internally, while overallocated firms
may not not want to bear the opportunity cost of not selling their surplus allowances on the
market.
The theoretical literature from the field of environmental economics postulates that differ-
ences in marginal abatement costs (MACs) will spur participation in the permit trade, in turn
leading to an equalization of MACs across market participants and aggregate cost efficiency in
equilibrium (Montgomery, 1972). Given the wide variety of firms represented in the EU ETS we
expect that MACs will differ significantly among CO2 emitting firms, providing incentives for
trading. However, even with significant MAC differentials some firms may choose not to enter
∗I am deeply grateful to Denny Ellerman and Christian von Hirschhausen. Without them this paper would not
have been possible. I also thank Jan Abrell, Jo¨rg Breitung, Franzi Bremus, Jochen Diekmann, Helmut Lu¨tkepohl,
Anne Neumann and Vanessa Valero for helpful conversations. However, all errors and omissions are mine. Special
thanks go to Rafael Trotignon for sharing his data and Thijs Jong for his help with some of the accounts.
1On a more general level, outsourcing decisions have received growing attention in the recent literature on the
national and international trade in intermediate goods (e.g. Antras and Helpman, 2004).
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the allowance market in the presence of transaction costs (Stavins, 1995), where in the EU ETS
especially the fixed cost may be significant (Jaraite et al., 2010). Additionally, participation
decisions may also be influenced by criteria other than rational profit maximization and may
lead to asymmetry between the demand and supply sides of an emission trading scheme, with
arguments of bounded rationality potentially applying (Simon, 1979; Radner, 1996).2 Such con-
siderations may lead to unequal MACs across firms in equilibrium, meaning that less trading
may occur than would be expected in the absence of transaction costs (Stavins, 1995). While
the existing literature is aware of the potential importance of trading costs in markets for inter-
mediate goods, the microfoundations of such costs are hitherto imperfectly understood (Bernard
et al., 2011). However, while information on marginal costs is typically unavailable, both in the
EU ETS and in other markets for tradable goods, based on the available evidence we have no
reason to believe that the EU ETS is in disequilibrium or subject to non-competitive behavior
(Ellerman et al., 2010).3
This paper aims to characterize the determinants of trading behavior by CO2 emitting firms
in the EU ETS while considering both participation in and the extent of trading. Our main focus
lies on the determinants of the inter-firm trade, both on the demand and supply sides of the EU
ETS, which is the relevant area of investigation considering the intermediate good character of
EUAs. We note the need to be mindful of a key feature that any study of trade must take into
account: As in the trade with any good, a firm can only trade non-negative amounts of emission
permits, including zero. The possibility of such a corner solution at zero, i.e. a trading outcome
at the corner of the distribution of possible trades, raises the question whether firms that do
trade positive amounts represent a random sample from the population of potential traders.
Alternatively, selection into trading may be non-random, i.e. self-selection may take place. In
the latter case selection bias in coefficient estimates may arise when evaluating the determinants
of observed trade flows if we do not account for the possibility of self-selection. Therefore, to
establish basic patterns of trading in the EU ETS and motivate the possible need for taking into
account the issue of non-random selection a thorough descriptive analysis of the available data
is required.
There is a large and growing literature on the firm-level determinants of the trade in goods,
both empirical and theoretical (cf. Bernard et al. (2011) for an extensive literature review).
Based on pathbreaking theoretical work on trade in the context of heterogeneous firms (e.g.
Melitz, 2003), numerous empirical micro studies have analyzed determinants of firm behavior in
the goods trade. The literature has established a strong positive link between indicators of firm
size and performance and the probability to enter markets for tradable goods (e.g. Bernard and
Jensen, 1999). One explanation is that firms may self-select into participating in trading based
on above-average productivity, thus being better able to deal with the sunk cost of entry into
a new market (Roberts and Tybout, 1997). The literature provides evidence of self-selection
both on the sell and buy sides. For instance, Bernard et al. (2010) find evidence of significant
selection bias in the decision whether to source intermediate goods within the firm or outside
it, with firm productivity also playing a significant role.
The existing empirical literature investigating the EU ETS microstructure is sparse. Jaraite
and Kazukauskas (2012) assess the extent of account holder level transaction costs, using data
on EU ETS transactions through compulsory installation accounts, operator holding accounts
in EU ETS parlance. Trotignon and Ellerman (2008) analyze trading patterns across registries
and sectors in the EU ETS based on annual EU ETS compliance data, while Abrell et al. (2011)
evaluate the effect of the EU ETS on firm outcome variables. The remainder of the existing
2For instance, firms with an allowance surplus may choose to forgo the possibility of making additional profit
from entering the EUA trade in the interest of avoiding additional organizational and decision complexity (Simon,
1979).
3If data on MACs were available this would allow us to evaluate the proximity of the observed trade flows to
the frictionless equilibrium outcome, i.e. it would help us evaluate the efficiency of the EU ETS.
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empirical literature on the EU ETS mostly analyzes EUA spot and futures prices in a time
series context. One stream of literature evaluates the fit of particular time series models to the
EUA price series (e.g. Benz and Tru¨ck, 2009), while another strand estimates the relationship
between EUA prices and the prices of energy commodities, such as crude oil, natural gas, hard
coal and electricity (Fell, 2010; Hintermann, 2010; Bredin and Muckley, 2011).
This paper aims to contribute to the literature as follows: First, we provide a detailed
descriptive overview of trading patterns during the early phase of the EU ETS, which, to the best
of our knowledge, has not yet been provided to the same extent. Second, we seek to understand
the drivers of CO2 emitting firms’ trading behavior by jointly modeling their participation and
amount decisions, while allowing for possible self-selection into trading. While focusing our
attention on both the demand and supply sides of the inter-firm EUA trade, we also consider
intra-firm transfers of allowances. We evaluate the determinants of the intra-firm EUA trade to
ascertain whether firms choosing to optimize their allowance portfolio internally are driven by
concerns similar to those trading EUAs externally. We test predictions regarding the firm-level
determinants of the EUA trade from the general trade literature, such as the greater propensity
for participation in trade based on size and performance indicators, as well as the presence of
self-selection.
Our analysis is based on a complete set of account-level EUA trade flows involving firms
required by law to participate in the EU ETS, using the currently available data on EU ETS
Phase I, i.e. the 2005 and 2006 compliance years.4 We consider trade flows from both emit-
ters’ operator holding accounts (OHAs) and person holding accounts (PHAs).5 We combine
these transactions data with balance sheet information on key firm characteristics, such as size,
productivity, profitability and ownership structure. We also add data on ex-post EU ETS com-
pliance.6
We estimate a corner solution model for each available cross section, i.e. for the 2005 and
2006 compliance years, using annually aggregated trading data. We find that participation
in the carbon permit market is driven by a combination of firm-specific characteristics, which
exist independently of the EU ETS, and market-specific factors, which firms exhibit in relation
to the EU ETS. In contrast, the firms’ decisions on amounts traded are found to be mostly
driven by market-specific concerns. Specifically, our results suggest that neither productivity
nor profitability affect the decision to participate in the EUA trade. Puzzlingly, the role of
firm size differs depending on the side of the market under consideration. The probability to
purchase EUAs is positively and significantly affected by firm size, whereas we find no significant
impact of size on the probability to sell permits to other firms. Ownership structure and the
4The 2005 compliance year began in February 2005 and ended at the end of April, 2006. The 2006 compliance
year started in May 2006 and ended at the end of April, 2007. It is important to note that the compliance year,
the period during which EUAs can be surrendered, is distinct from the period of obligation. Surrender obligations
are based on emissions for the respective calender year, while these obligations can be satisfied until the end of
the corresponding compliance year, which includes a grace period until the end of April of the following calender
year. Thus, when considering firm-level determinants of the allowance trade compliance years are the relevant
unit of time.
5Each installation, i.e. either factory or power plant, is assigned its own compulsory OHA. During the sample
period each installation received a free allocation of EUAs, and at the end of each compliance year a sufficient
number of allowances to cover each installation’s emissions during the preceding period of obligation must be
surrendered from OHAs to achieve compliance with the EU ETS. In contrast, PHAs are established on a voluntary
basis, by emitters or other entities wishing to engage in the EUA trade voluntarily. PHAs neither receive free
allocations nor can they be used for compliance purposes. However, a number of firms with associated OHAs also
held PHAs for convenience, so that it is important to incorporate the latter into any analysis aimed at achieving
a complete picture of emitters’ trading activities.
6Shortly after the end of each compliance year the European Commission publishes the amount of verified
emissions, as well as the amount of EUAs surrendered for compliance purposes at the installation level for the
previous compliance year. Together with the planned allocations, which are also published by the Comission, this
information allows us to compute each firm’s compliance position, i.e. whether it had a deficit or a surplus of
allowances during that particular compliance year.
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firm’s sector are also significant predictors of participation. We find that firms with a share of
government ownership larger than 50% are more likely to participate in the allowance trade,
while majority family-owned firms are less likely to do so. Firms in the industrial sector are
found to be less likely to participate in the EUA trade than electric utilities. The estimated
effects are also significant economically. In addition, the value of the initial EUA endowment,
as well as a firm’s ex-post EUA position significantly predict participation on both sides of
the inter-firm EUA trade, whereas the effect of the firm’s relative EUA position is found to be
weaker in the intra-firm trade. The amount of EUAs traded is found to be mostly driven by the
value of the firms’ free EUA allocation, and to some extent by their ex-post net EUA position
at the end of the compliance year. Finally, in contrast to the literature on the firm-level goods
trade we do not find a selection bias into EUA trading.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the dataset and
provides a descriptive overview of the EUA trade. Section 3 describes the methodology used,
while results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
2.1 Data
We first compile a dataset containing transactions in the entire EU ETS for the calendar period
2005-2007, from the EU Commission’s Community Independent Transactions Log (CITL).7 We
thus obtain full coverage of EU ETS permit flows for the compliance years 2005 and 2006.
This dataset contains transactions on the account level, covering government accounts, person
holding accounts (PHAs), as well as operator holding accounts (OHAs), i.e. accounts assigned to
installations emitting CO2 that are required by law to participate in the EU ETS. Each emitting
installation has its own OHA, into which it receives its allocations of EUAs at the beginning of
each compliance year, and from which it must surrender the appropriate number of EUAs at
the end of each compliance year. An installation is typically a factory or one of several blocks
of a large power plant. The data contain information about the amount of EUAs transacted,
the time at which the transaction has taken place, as well as some basic information on both
parties to the transaction.8
However, the transactions data contain no mapping from installations to firms, the relevant
unit of analysis, each of which may consist of one or more installations. Therefore, we match
the installations from the CITL transactions data to firms, based on the work by Trotignon
and Delbosc (2008). To conduct the matching we use additional information on OHAs, also
provided by the CITL. The matching covers 83% of the available aggregate allocations for the
2005 compliance year and 88% for the 2006 compliance year, which compares favorably to the
existing empirical literature on the firm-level determinants of international trade (e.g. Bernard
7CITL transactions data are released based on calendar years, with a delay of five years. For this reason data
going beyond December 2007 are currently unavailable.
8It is important to note that the timing of the trade between any two parties may well be different from the
timing of the actual transfer of a permit between two parties, which is what the CITL transaction data capture.
For instance, a trade may have been agreed to months before a transaction is settled, sometimes via the EUA
futures market. For the purposes of our analysis we will assume that both the trade and the transaction between
any two firms have taken place within the same compliance year, so that the distinction between the two becomes
immaterial, since we consider data aggregated annually, based on compliance years. We thus use terminology such
as “buy” and “sell’ while being mindful that the available information does not allow us to determine whether
each transactions we observe corresponds to a market transaction.
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et al., 2009).9 We also add annual EU ETS compliance data to this dataset, again using the
CITL’s information on OHAs as a connector.
Additionally, in order to obtain a complete picture of emitters’ activities in the EU ETS
it is important to consider PHAs, i.e. voluntary trading accounts maintained by a significant
number of firms also in possession of compulsory OHAs. Anecdotal evidence suggests that PHAs
were also used to manage the firms’ overall EUA portfolio, both internally and to purchase or
sell additional allowances on the market. Our firm-level transactions dataset thus includes
transactions by firms with at least one OHA, regardless of whether transactions were performed
through OHAs or PHAs and regardless of whether the counterparty is another firm with affected
installations or a financial intermediary. We exclude transactions involving government accounts,
as these activities mainly involve the receipt of allowance allocations and the compliance-related
surrender of allowances at the end of each compliance year. As the focus of this paper is on the
behavior of CO2 emitters, we exclude transactions purely between financial sector companies
with no OHAs. Extending the analysis to determinants of trading by the financial sector is left
for future work.
However, the CITL data and installation-to-firm matching do not contain information on
many relevant firm characteristics. For this reason we collect balance sheet information on these
firms, from AMADEUS. In a final step we combine the transactions data with the firm data
using our installation-to-firm matching.10 In our final dataset we are able to map 73% and 77%
of EU ETS allocations for the 2005 and 2006 compliance years, respectively, to firms including
a full set of firm-level control variables.
2.2 Descriptive Analysis
The transactions data with identified companies reveal several interesting patterns (Table 1).
Firms in our sample have received allocations of 1,640 and 1,730 million EUAs for the 2005 and
2006 compliance years, respectively.11 Accounts controlled by the firms in our sample acquired
EUAs for a total of 1,278 million tons of CO2 during the first two compliance years, whereas
they disposed of EUAs for 1,270 million tons of CO2 over the same period. However, once we
account for intra-firm transfers, we find that 469 million tons are purchased and 461 million tons
are sold beween firms during the first two compliance years. Thus, the majority of allowances
are traded internally.
Table 1: EUA Allocation and Trading Patterns for Identified Firms, in Million Tons of CO2
Allocation Total Sales Inter-Firm
Sales
Total Purchases Inter-Firm
Purchases
Intra-Firm
Transfers
2005 1,640 596 184 592 180 412
2006 1,730 674 277 686 289 397
Sum 3,370 1,270 461 1,278 469 809
We can establish an approximate benchmark for the relevant size of the inter-firm market by
summing up the absolute values of the firm-level excess allocations, i.e. of the differences between
9Transactions from the Danish registry could not be matched very well, as the available information on operator
holding accounts did not make this feasible. For the same reason, the matching for the Belgian and German
registries is also incomplete, although the problem was far less severe in these cases. Furthermore, we had to
exclude transactions from the Austrian and Greek registries, as information on domestic transactions in these
registries is not available in the CITL transactions database.
10While EU ETS compliance years run from February of each year to April of the following calendar year,
firm data in AMADEUS are reported on a calendar year basis. For our merge we assume that the information
contained in the firm control variables is stable between December and April of the following year.
11The raw transactions data indicate an overall allocation of 5,925 million tons of CO2 for all three years of
ETS Phase I. The discrepancy to the figure reported in Ellerman et al. (2010) appears to be mostly due to the
exclusion of transactions from the Austrian and Greek registries.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Total, Inter-Firm and Intra-Firm Purchases, in Million EUAs
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Figure 2: Evolution of Total, Inter-Firm and Intra-Firm Sales, in Million EUAs
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allocations and verified emissions for each company. Doing so yields an overall market size of
450 million tons of CO2 for the first two compliance years combined. While this number is only
suggestive, we find it reassuring that the amount of trade roughly compares to the benchmark
market size during those years. We next consider the distribution of EUA trading by the firms in
our sample over time. We observe that EUA purchases are strongly concentrated at two points of
each year, at the end of each compliance year and at the end of each calender year (Figure 1, top
panel). Inter-firm purchases are more pronounced at the end of each calender year, when EUA
futures are settled (Figure 1, middle panel). In contrast, intra-firm transfers are concentrated at
the end of each compliance year (Figure 1, bottom panel), suggesting an internal optimization
of allowance portfolios toward the end of each compliance year for a significant number of firms.
The pattern on the sell side is similar, although we find that inter-firm sales are somewhat more
spread throughout the year compared to inter-firm purchases (Figure 2).
As Table 2 shows, in each compliance year a significant number of firms participated neither
in inter-firm nor in intra-firm trading. For instance, out of 608 firms in our dataset that received
a positive EUA allocation in the 2005 compliance year and for which we have a full set of firm-
control variables available, 261 did not participate in any allowance trading at all (Table 2, left
column).12
Only 209 companies traded EUAs on both the supply and demand sides. 99 companies
only sold while not buying EUAs, whereas for 39 companies the reverse was true. As expected,
the majority of the non-participants belong to the group of companies which were long on
allowances, whereas only 72 companies which were short on allowances did not participate in
trading during the 2005 compliance year. We observe a uniform increase in participation during
the 2006 compliance year.
Table 2: Participation in Total Trading, by EUA Position
2005 2006
Participation: Sales vs. Purchases, All Companies
Purchases Purchases
0 1 Total 0 1 Total
Sales 0 261 39 300 Sales 0 204 78 282
1 99 209 308 1 113 271 384
Total 360 248 608 Total 317 349 666
Participation: Sales vs. Purchases, Long Companies
Purchases Purchases
0 1 Total 0 1 Total
Sales 0 189 10 199 Sales 0 157 12 169
1 97 145 242 1 109 193 302
Total 286 155 441 Total 266 205 471
Participation: Sales vs. Purchases, Short Companies
Purchases Purchases
0 1 Total 0 1 Total
Sales 0 72 29 101 Sales 0 47 66 113
1 2 64 66 1 4 78 82
Total 74 93 167 Total 51 144 195
The number of companies which received a positive allocation of EUAs increased to 666 (Table
2, right column), as some laggard registries, mainly the Italian and Polish ones, became fully
12The remainder of the descriptive analysis only considers firms for which we have a full set of firm-specific
characteristics available for consistency between the samples used for the descriptive analysis and the formal
analysis undertaken in Section 4.
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Figure 3: Trading Frequency, Total Sales
operational. The number of non-participants fell to 204, whereas now 271 companies both
bought and sold allowances during the same year. Participation increased for both long and
short companies.
However, participation is restricted to a small number of transactions per compliance year
for most companies. For instance, on the supply side the vast majority of firms either did
not trade at all or conducted at most five transactions in either compliance year (Figure 3).
However, most firms were not autarkic with regard to allowance management (Figure 4). Only
32 firms exclusively managed their EUA portfolio internally during the 2005 compliance year, as
measured by the ratio of total inter-firm trade to total trade, whereas 36 firms did so during the
2006 compliance year. A significant number of firms exclusively relied on the external market
and did not shift allowances internally at all, as evidenced by 181 and 262 firms with inter-firm
to total trade ratios of 1 during the 2005 and 2006 compliance years, respectively. The remaining
firms are spread fairly evenly between the extremes.
9
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Figure 4: Ratio of Inter-Firm to Total Trade
Having examined the firm’s trading behavior in the EU ETS, we turn our attention to the
characteristics of the firms in our sample. Table 3 presents the firms which received a positive
allocation during the 2006 compliance year. We observe that the sample is skewed towards large
and more profitable firms receiving large EUA allocations. The mean firm had a turnover of 5.6
billion Euro, received an allocation of about 2.3 million EUAs and employed more than 13,000
people. Furthermore, the mean firm was slightly short on EUAs.13 However, the median firm
was much smaller, with a turnover of less than 400 million Euro, an allocation of 200 thousand
EUAs and about 927 employees. It was also less profitable, with a return on assets of 4.1%.
Furthermore, the median firm was significantly long on EUAs. In addition, 28% of the firms in
our sample are majority-owned by the government, while 8% are majority family-owned. 62% of
the firms are classified as belonging to the combustion category by the CITL, with the remainder
13This slight underallocation in our estimation sample is a result of not having a complete set of control variables
available for the entire group of identified firms. When considering all identified firms, regardless of availability
of control variables, the mean firm is found to be long on allowances.
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having its main ETS-related activity in the industrial sector.14 The overall range is fairly large
according to all these metrics, giving us confidence that while larger firms are over-represented
our sample provides a fair picture of the players in the EU ETS.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, 2006 Cross Section
Variable Obs. Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Allocation (EUAs) 666 199,420 2,272,464 9,227,955 4 150,000,000
Verified Emissions (Metric Tons) 666 160,870 2,305,223 9,780,751 5 157,000,000
Turnover (Thousand Euro) 666 394,155 5,582,238 19,500,000 1,462 248,000,000
Number of Employees 636 927 13,539 38,697 4 368,500
Return on Assets (in Percent) 666 4.1 5.3 6.4 -17.5 51.0
As a final descriptive step we consider the trading patterns in relation to the firms’ EUA
position and their degree of market activity. Table 4 distinguishes the firms in our two cross
sections for which we have a full set of control variables available according to two criteria, the
EUA position (long vs. short) and whether the firm has actively managed its EUA portfolio
through the EU ETS, i.e. whether it has both sold and purchased EUAs outside its boundaries
during the compliance year in question.15
For the 2005 cross section we find that the aggregate ex-post EUA position of both groups of
long firms, active and less active, was broadly similar. However, this overall allowance surplus
is divided among far fewer firms for the group of active companies. Thus, a larger individual
allocation appears to be related to stronger involvement in allowance trading. Furthermore,
the more active long firms appear to have realized their profit opportunities from selling EUAs
more fully during the 2005 compliance year, while the less active long firms only sold about half
of their surplus allowances during the 2005 compliance year. Active short firms represent an
allocation of about 737 million EUAs in the 2005 cross section, with most of the largest players
by allocation size belonging to this group. During the 2005 compliance year this group exhibits
net purchases on aggregate, while not quite covering its allowance deficit, meaning that the
actively trading firms that were short on EUAs resorted to borrowing for the 2005 compliance
year. The group of less active firms almost exclusively bought EUAs to cover some of their
deficit, but also borrowed significantly as a group, to the tune of almost 9 million EUAs. These
trends in aggregate trading behavior led to net banking of about 7 million EUAs in our sample
during the 2005 compliance year.
When considering the 2006 compliance year, we notice that the aggregate amount of EUAs
covered by our sample increases from 1.44 billion to 1.51 billion tons of CO2, mainly as a
result of the Italian and Polish registries becoming operational. The majority of these new
entrants appears to have been long on EUAs and actively involved in trading, since the aggregate
allocation for this group increases from to 446 million EUAs. Both active and less active long
firms sold heavily to other firms. Active short firms became major net buyers during the 2006
14The CITL assigns main activity codes to each emitting installations’ account, with each account receiving
only one classification. Codes are divided into the following categories: combustion, mineral oil refining, coke
ovens, metal ore roasting, pig iron/steel production, cement production, glass production, ceramics production,
paper and pulp production, as well as a residual opt-in category. To avoid problems with the estimation of so
many separate dummy variables we create the industry dummy variable equaling zero if the main activity type is
combustion and one if the activity falls into any of the other categories, excluding the opt-in activity. The reason
for singling out combustion is that the largest share of aggregate EU ETS allocations belongs to this category.
In many cases this means electricity generation. However, several firms which would be considered industrial
concerns have all of their EU-ETS-related installations classified as having combustion as its main activity. For
instance, this typically applies for car manufacturers. Since we do not have any other information available to
classify the companies by sector and since we do not want to introduce arbitrariness by re-classifying firms by
hand, we have kept the CITL classification. Additionally, after matching installations to firms we sometimes
find that installations with several activity types belong to the same firm. In this case we categorize the firm as
belonging to the industrial sector if the majority of its emissions is caused in installations classified as industrial.
15The distinction into active and less active companies is admittedly ad hoc. However, we believe it is useful
in structuring our analysis.
11
Aleksandar Zaklan
compliance year, with net purchases of some 120 million EUAs, roughly covering both their
deficit for the 2006 compliance year and their borrowing from the previous year.
Table 4: EUA Trading Patterns, by Firm Activity and Allowance Position, in Million Tons of CO2
Firms Allocation Surplus
Alloca-
tion
Inter-
Firm
Sales
Inter-
Firm
Pur-
chases
Net
Inter-
Firm
Trade
Net Bor-
rowing
Long Active 69 (11.3%) 256.2 (17.8%) 38.3 45.5 22.6 23.0 -15.4
Less Active 372 (61.2%) 320.0 (22.3%) 41.7 21.7 0.3 21.4 -20.3
2005 Short Active 36 (5.9%) 736.9 (51.3%) -68.7 90.0 138.9 -48.9 19.8
Less Active 131 (21.5%) 123.2 (8.6%) -20.5 0.3 12.1 -11.8 8.7
Sum 608 1,436.4 -9.2 157.5 173.8 -16.3 -7.1
Long Active 110 (16.5%) 446.1 (29.5%) 47.9 106.5 53.0 57.1 5.6
Less Active 361 (54.2%) 284.8 (18.8%) 38.8 34.5 0.7 32.9 -5.0
2006 Short Active 46 (6.9%) 630.0 (41.6%) -84.5 96.0 211.0 -119.9 -30.6
Less Active 149 (22.4%) 152.7 (10.1%) -24.1 4.9 17.0 -12.0 12.1
Sum 666 1,513.6 -21.8 241.9 281.7 -41.8 -17.9
Note: Long indicates that the firm’s allocation exceeds its verified emissions in the respective compliance year; Active is
defined as having conducted at least one inter-firm purchase and sale during the particular compliance year; net inter-firm
trade measures the difference between inter-firm sales and inter-firm purchases, while net borrowing captures the difference
between net inter-firm trade and surplus allocation for the given compliance year. Negative values of net borrowing indicate
that net banking has occurred.
3 Methodology
The firms in our sample face a twin decision. They first must decide whether to participate in
trading at all and, in case they do participate, what amount to trade. This decision problem
gives rise to the following population model:
yi1 = xi1β1 + i1 (1)
yi2 = xi2β2 + i2, (2)
where yi1 denotes the logarithm of the amount of emission permits traded, while yi2 is a dummy
variable equaling 1 if the firm trades a positive amount of EUAs and 0 if it does not. Therefore,
a positive yi1 is only observed for firms participating in trading, while yi2 is available for all firms
in the sample. Thus, firms are faced with a corner solution problem, with the dependent variable
being in logarithms. Correspondingly, xi1 is the set of control variables containing information
about firms that trade, whereas xi2 consists of covariates for all firms. We assume that i1 and
i2 are normally distributed. Given the selection decision, the regression function for the subset
of available data on amounts traded depends not only on xi1 but also on the rule according
to which the sample has been selected. Thus, (2) enters the conditional expectation of (1) as
follows:
E(yi1|xi1, i2) = xi1β1 + E(i1|xi2, i2) = xi1β1 + γ1i2 (3)
Accordingly, the existence of a sample selection bias depends on the correlation between the error
terms in (1) and (2). Neglecting this issue by estimating (1) only based on the information from
the selected sample can give rise to an omitted variable problem (Heckman, 1979). However, as
Heckman (1979) has shown, this bias can be corrected for by including an additional regressor
in (1). Using iterated expectations on (3) we obtain
E(yi1|xi1, yi2 = 1) = xi1β1 + γ1λ(xi2δ2), (4)
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where λ(xi2δ2) =
φ(xi2δ2)
Φ(xi2δ2)
is the inverse Mills ratio. Estimating (4) yields consistent estimates of
β1. λ(xi2δ2) cannot be directly computed from the data, as it involves the unknown parameter
vector δ2. However, it can be consistently estimated using Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure.
In a first step we obtain δˆ2 by performing a probit estimation of the probability that firms will
participate in trading:
P (yi2 = 1|xi2) = Φ(xi2δ2) (5)
In a second step we regress yi1 on xi1 and λˆ(·), our estimate of the inverse Mills ratio. A
simple t-test of H0 : λ1 = 0 allows us to test for the existence of a selection bias in the firms’
amount decision induced by its participation decision. Furthermore, in addition to yielding
consistent estimates for the coefficient vector in the amount decision we obtain determinants of
the probability to participate in trading, which is also of primary interest in this study. We thus
interpret the Heckman (1979) approach as a flexible way of dealing with corner solutions.16
In principle xi1 and xi2 can contain identical regressors. However, in the case of identical
regressors we rely on the non-linearity of λˆ(·) for identification. To avoid a possible collinearity
problem, it is desirable to use exclusion restrictions, if applicable, so that xi1 and xi2 differ, i.e.
to include variables in the estimation of the firm’s participation decision which do not affect its
amount decision (e.g. Bernard et al., 2010). We assume that a firm’s total size, as measured
by turnover, determines participation, while it is not related to the amount decision.17 The
reason is that firms are covered by the EU ETS unevenly, depending on their activities, so that
smaller firms may end up with a larger EUA allocation than large corporations with activities
that mostly lie outside the EU ETS. Furthermore, the relationship between turnover and firms’
excess allocation amounts, i.e. the difference between allocation and verified emissions, is even
weaker. The excess allocation determines whether the firm will tend to be on the supply or on
the demand side in the allowance trade, so that a systematic relationship between firm size and
excess allocation could be expected to influence the amounts traded.18 Instead, we use turnover
as a proxy for a firm’s ability to overcome the fixed cost of participating in EUA trading, based
on the premise that larger firms are more likely to have the resources necessary to overcome the
costs of engaging in trading. Our second exclusion restriction is that the ratio of the EUA stock
to turnover also only affects participation. This variable serves as a proxy for the firm’s incentive
to overcome the cost of participating, measuring the relative value of the firm’s EUA stock in
proportion to its overall size. A larger value of this ratio should provide a greater incentive to
engage in trading, especially in inter-firm trading, while the actual amount traded should be
driven by the absolute value of the EUA stock only.
The remainder of xi2 and all of xi1 are made up as follows: We include the log of the ratio
of turnover to total assets as a measure of productivity and the return on assets as a proxy
for firm profitability. Dummy variables indicate whether a company was majority government-
owned or majority family-owned. Another dummy shows whether a company belonged to the
industrial sector or had its ETS relevant activities in combustion. Additionally, we include
variables capturing EU ETS specific aspects of the firm. A dummy indicates whether a firm
was long on EUAs at the end of the respective period of obligation, i.e. the calender year the
respective compliance year corresponded with, based on the difference between its allocation
and its verified emissions. Finally, we include the value of the stock of each firm’s free EUA
allocation. Details on the precise definition of all variables in our dataset, including data sources,
16Given the assumption of log normality in the amount equation the literature also calls this approach the
exponential Type II Tobit model (Wooldridge, 2010).
17The results are similar when using employment or total assets to capture firm size.
18The pairwise correlation coefficients between turnover and the company-level allocation is 0.27 and 0.29 for the
full 2005 and 2006 estimation samples, respectively, while the correlations between turnover and excess allocation
are -0.1 and -0.08 for the respective full samples.
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can be found in the Appendix.
We conduct separate estimations for cross sections for the 2005 and 2006 compliance years of
EU ETS Phase I, since each year displays a distinct evolution of the EUA spot price, and also to
capture possible learning effects from one compliance year to the next.19 For each cross section
we perform estimations for two samples of companies. The full sample contains information on
all companies for which the full set of data is available, while the less-active sample excludes
firms that have both bought and sold EUAs at least once during the same compliance year.
Thus, the less-active sample excludes the observations for the latter firms from both stages of
the estimation, while the number of observations for the firms that do not participate in the EUA
trade during the year in question remains unchanged. This means that the ratio of censored to
non-censored observations increases for the case of the less-active sample. With this, admittedly
rough, criterion we aim to distinguish between firms that managed their allowance portfolio
actively from those that may have bought and sold mostly based on residual concerns.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Inter-Firm Purchases
We first consider the demand side of the inter-company trade in EUAs (Table 5). The first
stage of our estimation reveals that several company characteristics significantly predict par-
ticipation in inter-company EUA trading on the buyer side. Company size is positively and
significantly related with the probability to engage in EUA purchases. Our estimates for the full
samples indicate that a one percent increase in turnover leads to a 4.5% and 3.3% increase in the
probability to participate, respectively, when considering the full samples for each cross section.
This finding corresponds to results from the empirical literature on international trade, which
finds that larger firms are more likely to engage in trade. The log of the total value of a firm’s
EUA allocation available for trade20 is also found to increase the participation probability in
both years, with a one-percent increase leading to a 4.2% and 4.3% increase in the participation
probability, respectively. Thus, for the full sample the size of the effect of a firm-specific charac-
teristic is on par with an EU-ETS-specific variable in its impact on the likelihood to participate
in trading. Furthermore, we find a positive but insignificant effect of the relative value of the
EUA allocation to the firm, as measured by the value of the annual EUA allocation as a share
of firm size, on participation. Ownership structure also has a significant impact on participation
in 2005, while being insignificant in 2006, at least for the full sample. We find that majority
government-owned firms were 15% more likely to purchase EUAs externally in 2005. The firm’s
sector also has a significant impact on participation in both years. Having its main activity in
the industrial sector rather in combustion reduces the participation probability by 17.6% and
15.9%, respectively.21 However, this effect is much diminished when excluding the active firms
19We do not report results for 2007, for two reasons. First, data availability does not allow for a complete
picture of the trading behavior during that year. Transaction data are currently only available through the end
of the 2007 calendar year, whereas most of the trade for both the 2005 and 2006 compliance years took place
during the months immediately prior to the end of the compliance year. Second, 2007 was the last year of the
self-contained first ETS trading period, with EUA prices close to zero, suggesting that a significant proportion of
trading may have been driven by residual concerns at the end of the period. However, estimation results based
on currently available data are available upon request.
20This variable measures the actual stock of EUAs transferred into the firms’ accounts by the national registries
during a particular compliance year, which is why the full sample is smaller for the 2005 compliance year, as some
firms did not receive their allocation before the start of the 2006 compliance year.
21We performed additional regressions separately considering the samples of firms from the combustion and
industrial sectors as a robustness test. The main results are broadly similar in terms of coefficient size and
significance and are available upon request.
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from the sample.22 Thus, we find evidence of a more active allowance management in the com-
bustion sector relative to the industrial sector. Other important firm characteristics, such as
firm profitability and productivity are not found to have a significant impact on participation.
These results are in contrast to findings in the general trade literature. Finally, we find strong
evidence that firms which were long on EUAs were significantly less likely to engage in inter-firm
EUA purchases, across all samples and in both 2005 and 2006.
Table 5: Determinants of Inter-Firm EUA Purchases
2005 2006
Full Sample Less Active Full Sample Less Active
ln(Value of Inter-Firm Purchases)
ln(Value of EUA Stock) 0.830∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EUA Position: Long -3.100∗∗∗ -2.376 -1.243 -1.905
(0.000) (0.169) (0.133) (0.482)
ln(Turnover/Total Assets) 0.042 0.248 0.033 0.121
(0.910) (0.564) (0.846) (0.693)
Return on Assets 0.042 0.045 0.023 0.038
(0.196) (0.323) (0.237) (0.152)
Government-Owned 0.490 0.682 0.290 0.169
(0.420) (0.308) (0.440) (0.788)
Family-Owned -3.845∗∗ -1.500∗∗ 0.212 0.032
(0.020) (0.046) (0.659) (0.949)
Industry -0.364 -0.680 -0.472 -0.264
(0.637) (0.477) (0.284) (0.570)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.915 0.687 -0.492 0.610
(0.395) (0.648) (0.676) (0.742)
Constant -0.087 2.931 1.603 1.255
(0.976) (0.223) (0.397) (0.283)
Participation: Inter-Firm Purchases
Value of EUA Stock/Turnover 0.034 0.020 0.110 0.115
(0.677) (0.753) (0.514) (0.413)
ln(Turnover) 0.045∗∗∗ 0.015∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.000) (0.090) (0.003) (0.219)
ln(Value of EUA Stock) 0.042∗∗∗ -0.001 0.043∗∗∗ -0.010
(0.000) (0.891) (0.000) (0.262)
EUA Position: Long -0.323∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗ -0.454∗∗∗ -0.513∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Turnover/Total Assets) -0.018 -0.003 0.045 0.041
(0.602) (0.859) (0.209) (0.129)
Return on Assets 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.569) (0.612) (0.376) (0.737)
Government-Owned 0.150∗∗ 0.031 -0.037 -0.048
(0.014) (0.452) (0.508) (0.249)
Family-Owned -0.100 -0.016 -0.084 0.023
(0.162) (0.709) (0.255) (0.699)
Industry -0.176∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.069∗
(0.000) (0.027) (0.001) (0.085)
Observations 608 503 666 510
Censored Observations 445 445 406 406
Wald Chi2 59.90 51.07 201.47 164.68
Wald Chi2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bootstrap p-values are in parentheses based on 1000 replications, with *, **, *** indicating
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Marginal effects are reported for
the participation equation. Marginal effects for dummy variables are computed for a discrete
change from 0 to 1.
Quantitatively the result is also very significant. Long firms were 32.3% less likely to participate
in EUA purchases for the full 2005 sample, while this probability falls to 28.6% for the less-active
22The estimations involving the less-active samples are conducted based on a lower share of observations ex-
hibiting a dummy indicating participation in the first stage, and thus a smaller number of non-zero observations
in the second stage. Given the high share of non-participation in the less-active samples, the results should be
treated with the appropriate caution. However, we feel reassured by the broad consistency of the coefficient
estimates in terms of signs and significance across samples.
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sample. This effect strengthens in 2006, with the probability of non-participation increasing well
above 40% in both samples. Thus, while market-specific factors such as the available stock of
EUAs and the relative compliance position of the firm significantly predict the probability to
engage in carbon permit trading, a number of company-specific characteristics are also signifi-
cant, indicating that in the EU ETS both sets of determinants come together in influencing the
firms’ decision whether to trade.
We next turn to the relationship between the participation and amount equations. Our
estimate of the inverse Mills ratio is insignificant in all cases for the 2005 and 2006 cross sections.
Therefore, we find no evidence of a selection bias, suggesting that the decisions whether to engage
in inter-firm EUA purchasing at all and how much to purchase were not significantly related.
This finding is in contrast to the results in the general trade literature, suggesting that self-
selection does not appear to be of the same importance as in the case of regular traded goods.
Considering the amount decision, we find that a larger initial EUA allocation leads to larger
purchases in both years, suggesting that an increase in the value of the EUA stock by 1%
increases purchases by between 0.6% and 0.83%, depending on year and sample. We also find
a significnat effect of ownership structure in the 2005 samples, with family-owned companies
acquiring significantly fewer EUAs. Finally, we find that firms that were long on EUAs ex post
bought significantly fewer EUAs in the 2005 full sample, ceteris paribus. However, this effect is
neither significant in the less-active 2005 sample nor in either 2006 sample. Thus, the amount
decision appears to be dominated by the market-specific factor allocation size.
4.2 Inter-Firm Sales
We next consider the supply side of the EU ETS (Table 6). Analogously to our results on
the demand side, we find that neither firm productivity nor profitability significantly predict
participation in the EUA trade. We find that the value of the EUA stock available for trading
positively and significantly predicts the likelihood of engaging in the sale of EUAs both in 2005
and 2006. Coefficient estimates are larger than on the demand side, with a one percent increase
in the value of a firm’s initial EUA stock increasing its probability to participate in selling EUAs
by around 10% in the full samples. The value of the EUA stock relative to the value of the
firm is again mostly insignificant, as is firm size. The result on turnover is in contrast to our
finding that firm size significantly predicts participation on the demand side of the EU ETS. Ex
ante, we would expect transaction cost considerations to play a similar role on both sides of the
EUA trade, meaning that larger firms should to be more likely to participate in the EUA trade.
Therefore, this finding constitutes a puzzle. The results regarding the ownership and industry
dummies are similar to our findings on the demand side regarding sign and significance for the
2005 cross section, while the absolute values of the coefficient estimates are generally larger. In
particular, the industry dummy is still negative and highly significant in both years and for both
samples, with the coefficient estimate suggesting a decrease in the participation probability by
up to 23.6% if the firm’s main activity lay outside the combustion category.
Furthermore, again we find a strongly significant effect on participation for firms that were
long on allowances. Being long on allowances increased the probability to sell EUAs by some
26-33%, in both years and both samples. Thus, it appears that the participation decision on the
supply side was also driven by a combination of firm-specific and market-specific factors during
the first EU ETS compliance year, again partially analogous to findings from the wider trade
literature. However, in the second year market-specific concerns appear to have dominated,
apart from the distinction in trading probability between the combustion and industry sectors.
Our results on the inverse Mills ratio suggest that there is no significant selection bias on the
supply side of the EU ETS, supporting our finding for the demand side in this respect. Again,
this is in contrast to the results in the wider trade literature.
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Table 6: Determinants of Inter-Firm EUA Sales
2005 2006
Full Sample Less Active Full Sample Less Active
ln(Value of Inter-Firm Sales)
ln(Value of EUA Stock) 1.075∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
EUA Position: Long 1.536∗∗ 1.426 0.491 2.671
(0.031) (0.618) (0.470) (0.120)
ln(Turnover/Total Assets) -0.136 0.004 -0.173 -0.199
(0.532) (0.988) (0.251) (0.347)
Return on Assets 0.022 0.023 0.007 0.033
(0.334) (0.330) (0.609) (0.197)
Government-Owned 0.272 0.454 -0.202 -0.090
(0.531) (0.461) (0.400) (0.790)
Family-Owned -0.299 0.204 -0.077 -0.319
(0.697) (0.838) (0.875) (0.568)
Industry -0.628 -0.051 0.034 -0.815
(0.236) (0.937) (0.946) (0.170)
Inverse Mills Ratio 1.286 0.329 -0.707 1.940
(0.295) (0.870) (0.580) (0.186)
Constant -6.153 -1.204 1.381 -6.265
(0.164) (0.883) (0.736) (0.241)
Participation: Inter-Firm Sales
Value of EUA Stock/Turnover -0.141 -0.190∗ -0.172 -0.356
(0.207) (0.050) (0.451) (0.248)
ln(Turnover) 0.008 -0.015 0.012 -0.007
(0.541) (0.122) (0.315) (0.569)
ln(Value of EUA Stock) 0.100∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EUA Position: Long 0.266∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Turnover/Total Assets) -0.003 -0.010 -0.032 -0.014
(0.949) (0.748) (0.384) (0.685)
Return on Assets -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.005
(0.548) (0.830) (0.523) (0.225)
Government-Owned 0.199∗∗∗ 0.076 0.051 0.009
(0.005) (0.205) (0.400) (0.868)
Family-Owned -0.171∗∗ -0.072 -0.144∗ -0.049
(0.021) (0.193) (0.052) (0.484)
Industry -0.196∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 608 503 666 510
Censored Observations 353 353 346 346
Wald Chi2 171.55 101.55 205.48 109.55
Wald Chi2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bootstrap p-values are in parentheses based on 1000 replications, with *, **, *** indicating
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Marginal effects are reported for
the participation equation. Marginal effects for dummy variables are computed for a discrete
change from 0 to 1.
We then consider the amount decision on the supply side. As in the case of purchases, we find
that a larger EUA allocation is positively and significantly related to the amount sold for both
years and all samples, while the coefficient estimates are somewhat larger than their equivalents
on the demand side. Analogously to the demand side we only find weak evidence of the firms’
relative compliance position on the amount sold externally.
4.3 Intra-Firm Transfers
Finally, we estimate the determinants of intra-company transfers of EUAs, i.e. one installation
of a company receiving EUAs from another installation within the same company (Table 7).
While this part of the analysis does not belong to our main focus, we consider the drivers of
firms’ decisions to optimize their permit portfolio internally and compare it to our results on the
inter-firm trade.23 For the analysis in this section we exclude companies consisting of only one
23The results in this section are identical no matter whether we consider intra-firm “sales” or “purchases”, as
they exactly mirror each other.
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installation, as they cannot conduct intra-firm trade with EUAs by definition, leading to smaller
samples in this section. The determinants of the participation decision are similar to those of
the participation decision in inter-company purchases in terms of the sign and significance of the
value of the firm’s EUA stock, as well as of the ownership and industry dummies for the 2005
cross section. In contrast to the inter-firm regressions the EUA-stock-to-turnover ratio enters
with a negative sign, although it is only significant in the 2006 samples.24 Productivity and
profitability also do not significantly predict participation in intra-firm EUA transfers. The key
difference compared to inter-firm EUA purchases is the role of firm size, which is not found to
significantly enter the participation decision. Also, in contrast to its role in inter-firm purchases
of EUAs, the effect of the relative EUA position is found to be weaker, both statistically and
quantitatively.
Table 7: Determinants of Intra-Firm EUA Transfers
2005 2006
Full Sample Less Active Full Sample Less Active
ln(Value of Intra-Firm Transfers)
ln(Value of EUA Stock) 0.959∗∗ 0.528 0.860∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.224) (0.000) (0.000)
EUA Position: Long -0.915 0.010 -0.285 0.107
(0.337) (0.995) (0.375) (0.817)
ln(Turnover/Total Assets) -0.371 -0.245 -0.372 -0.226
(0.412) (0.763) (0.167) (0.456)
Return on Assets -0.032 -0.006 -0.018 0.026
(0.599) (0.955) (0.515) (0.510)
Government-Owned -0.463 -1.581 -1.297∗∗∗ -1.429∗∗∗
(0.663) (0.356) (0.002) (0.004)
Family-Owned 0.428 1.033 -0.446 -1.100
(0.880) (0.862) (0.501) (0.187)
Industry 0.290 0.667 -0.432 0.680
(0.789) (0.714) (0.171) (0.152)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.449 -2.206 -1.156 -0.572
(0.901) (0.750) (0.111) (0.736)
Constant -2.179 5.500 0.452 0.901
(0.819) (0.677 ) (0.812) (0.740)
Participation: Intra-Firm Transfers
Value of EUA Stock/Turnover -0.103 -0.207 -1.052 -1.303∗
(0.504) (0.262) (0.315) (0.062)
ln(Turnover) 0.008 -0.001 0.030∗ 0.003
(0.620) (0.498) (0.098) (0.869)
ln(Value of EUA Stock) 0.071∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.028
(0.000) (0.009) (0.001) (0.129)
EUA Position: Long -0.161∗∗∗ -0.091 -0.124∗∗ -0.086
(0.009) (0.162) (0.029) (0.218)
ln(Turnover/Total Assets) -0.004 -0.004 -0.029 -0.006
(0.928) (0.913) (0.512) (0.900)
Return on Assets -0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.002
(0.526) (0.572) (0.716) (0.691)
Government-Owned 0.166∗∗ 0.076 0.120∗ 0.053
(0.024) (0.297) (0.077) (0.473)
Family-Owned -0.258∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.176∗ -0.129
(0.000) (0.001) (0.081) (0.167)
Industry -0.147∗∗ -0.088 -0.066 -0.050
(0.011) (0.109) (0.277) (0.441)
Observations 441 345 471 331
Censored Observations 267 241 263 216
Wald Chi2 50.82 15.19 224.84 135.51
Wald Chi2 p-value 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.000
Bootstrap p-values are in parentheses based on 1000 replications, with *, **, *** indicating
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Marginal effects are reported for
the participation equation. Marginal effects for dummy variables are computed for a discrete
change from 0 to 1.
24Note that we have rescaled this variable by a factor of 1,000 to avoid having to present the otherwise very
small coefficients.
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Thus, the firms’ EUA position appeared to have a weaker impact on internal than on external
permit portfolio optimization. This result is not unexpected, as the dummy indicating the
relative EUA position contains information on the position of the firm as a whole. We expect
that the extent of internal EUA trading should also be driven by the distribution of long and
short positions among a firm’s installations. Therefore, the variable measuring the firm’s overall
position would be expected to be less influential in the case of intra-firm trading.25 As in the
case of inter-firm trade both on the supply and demand sides, the intra-firm EUA trade also
does not exhibit a significant selection bias.
In line with our results on the inter-firm trade, we find that the amount of EUAs transferred
internally significantly increases with the value of the EUA stock available to the firm in the
respective compliance year. A one-percent-increase in the EUA stock approximately resulted in
increases in the intra-firm EUA trade by between 0.76% and 0.96%. The government dummy is
negative and strongly significant in the 2006 samples, while being insignificant in 2005.
Hence, our results suggest that both the intra-firm and inter-firm EUA trade share a subset
of determinants, with firm-specific factors mostly affecting the participation decision in both
cases.
5 Conclusion
The establishment of the EU ETS has turned the right to emit CO2 into an intermediate good for
the firms required to comply with EU ETS regulations, leading to a decision whether to source
compliance within the firm’s boundaries or to trade for it through the EU ETS. However, free
allocation, abatement and intertemporal flexibility have created the potential for non-trading
on the firm level in any given period, leading to possible self-selection into trading. This paper
seeks to understand the drivers of firms’ decisions to engage in trading carbon emission permits
during any particular year, as well as the intensity of their trading activity. We consider these
questions based on a newly constructed dataset mapping account-based transactions data on
the first two compliance years of the European Emission Trading Scheme to the level of firms.
While focusing on the behavior of CO2 emitters required to participate in the EU ETS by law,
our mapping contains information from both operator and person holding accounts held by
emitting firms. We combine the data on permit holdings and trading with firm-level balance
sheet information capturing key characteristics of the firms involved.
A thorough descriptive analysis of the microstructure of the EU ETS sets the stage for our
further quantitative analysis. We estimate a corner solution model for the supply and demand
sides of both the inter-firm and intra-firm permit trade, while allowing for self-selection into
trading. We find that firm-specific characteristics existing independently of the EU ETS such
as size, sector, and ownership structure play a significant role in the firms’ decision whether
to participate in the permit trade at all. Notably, the role of firm size differs on the demand
and supply sides of the inter-firm trade. In contrast to the general literature on the firm-
level determinants of the trade in goods we do not find that productivity significantly predicts
either participation in the permit trade or the amounts traded. Furthermore, market-specific
factors, i.e. characteristics that firms only exhibit in relation to the EU ETS, such as the
value of the firms’ free permit allocation and its relative compliance position, also significantly
predict participation in the permit trade. However, the amounts traded are found to be mostly
determined by these market-specific factors.
Our results suggest that the set-up of the EU ETS with free allocation and intertemporal
flexibility afforded firms some leeway to exhibit behavior similar to the patterns revealed by
the existing literature on firm-level determinants of the trade in goods, particularly regarding
25However, for the purpose camparability we choose to keep our set of explanatory variables consistent across
all regressions.
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participation in the permit trade. However, we also find that amounts of allowances traded are
ultimately driven by features of firms directly related to their standing in the EU ETS.
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Appendix: List of Variables
Dependent Variables
Quantitative Variables
• ln(Value of inter-firm sales): Natural logarithm of the value of EUA flows that leave the
firm, drawn from CITL transactions data. We use the average EUA spot price in Euro for
each compliance year to compute the value of this and the other value variables.
• ln(Value of inter-firm purchases): Natural logarithm of the value of EUA flows that enter
the firm, drawn from CITL transactions data.
• ln(Value of intra-firm transfers): Natural logarithm of the value of EUA flows that leave
one installation and enter another installation of the same firm in the same year, drawn
from CITL transactions data, computed for firms consisting of more than one installation.
Categorical Variables
• Participation: Inter-firm sales: = 1 if the firm’s value of inter-firm exports > 0 in a
particular compliance year; and = 0 otherwise.
• Participation: Inter-firm purchases: = 1 if the firm’s value of inter-firm imports > 0 in a
particular compliance year; and = 0 otherwise.
• Participation: Intra-firm transfers: = 1 if the firm’s value of intra-firm exports > 0 in a
particular compliance year; and = 0 otherwise.
Independent Variables
Quantitative Variables
• ln(Value of EUA stock): Natural logarithm of the value of each firm’s EUA stock in
Euro, as available for trading in each compliance year. This variable is based on CITL
transactions data, and thus may differ from the firm’s NAP allocation, e.g. due to delays
in some national registries becoming operational (Poland and Italy are cases in point).
• ln(Turnover): Natural logarithm of the firm’s annual turnover as reported in AMADEUS,
in Euro.
• Value of EUA stock / turnover: Ratio of the value of the firm’s EUA stock to its turnover.
This variable has been rescaled to avoid very small coefficients.
• ln(Turnover/total assets): Natural logarithm of the ratio of the firm’s annual turnover to
the value of its total assests as reported in AMADEUS, in Euro.
• Return on assets: Return on assets as reported in AMADEUS, in percent.
Categorical Variables
• Government-owned: = 1 if the government owns more than 50% of the firm; and = 0
otherwise. Based on AMADEUS data.
• Family-owned: = 1 if a single person or a family owns more than 50% of the firm; and =
0 otherwise. Based on AMADEUS data.
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• EUA position: long: = 1 if the firm’s allocation is larger than its verified emissions in that
compliance year, based on CITL compliance data; and = 0 otherwise.
• Industry: = 1 if the majority of the firm’s emissions were generated in installations classi-
fied outside of the combustion category based on the main activity codes from the CITL
compliance data; and = 0 otherwise.
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